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Legislature's intent that a driver need
not be told ofall possible consequences
between refusing and failing a chemical test for alcohol. In addition, by
fmding that the word "sanctions" does
not encompass mere possibilities, the
court has refused to recognize additional procedural safeguards for persons who decline to take chemical alcohol concentration tests. By deciding
that an officer is not required to advise
a driver of potential eligibility for
modification of suspension or restrictive license ifa driver takes the chemical alcohol test, the court has implied
that a person who refuses to take the
test must be prepared to face the consequences.
- Ellen Marth
R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul: CITY OR-

DINANCE BANNING CROSS
BURNINGS AND OTHER SYMBOLS OF HATE SPEECH VIOLA TES THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
In R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a city ordinance banning cross burnings and other
hate crimes violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
because it discriminated on the basis of
speech content and was not reasonably
necessary to achieve the compelling
interest of protecting groups that have
historically been the victims of discrimination. While the Court unanimously agreed that the law was facially invalid, it was divided over the
proper analysis of the ordinance under
the First Amendment. The Court's
decision resulted in a clash of interpretations, with a four member concurrence charging the majority with abandoning long established First Amendment principles.
In 1990, the petitioner, a white teenager, burned a cross on the front lawn
of a black family that had recently
moved into the city ofSt. Paul, Minnesota. The petitioner was charged with
violating a local hate crime law that
prohibited the display of a symbol
18

which aroused anger, alann, or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. The
ordinance specifically cited cross burning and swastika displays as acts punishable under its mandate.
The trial court dismissed the charges
on the grounds that the law was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota rejected the overbreadth
claim and upheld the ordinance because the statute limited its reach to
"fighting words" and was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The petitioner challenged the constitutionality ofthe statute, arguing that it infringed upon his
First Amendment right to free speech.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider whether the ordinance discriminated impermissibly on the basis
of content, and, if so, whether such
discrimination was reasonably necessary to achieve the state's compelling
interest in protecting those who have
historically been the targets of discrimination.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
began his analysis by acknowledging
that limited categories ofspeech - such
as obscenity, defamation and fighting
words - had been proscribed on the
basis of content because their low social value was outweighed by a higher
social interest. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at
2543 (citing Chap/inskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942». In
this case, however, the majority rejected the view that "fighting words,"
defined as insults which are likely to
provoke the listener to react violently,
were entirely without constitutional
protection. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
The Court determined that the government could proscribe "fighting words"
in general because of the activity they
provoked, but it could not proscribe
specific sub-categories of fighting
words because of the ideas they expressed orthe classes they targeted. Id.
at 2544. Thus, the majority found that
the St. Paul ordinance was content
discriminatory because it imposed spe-

cial prohibitions on those who expressed views on the disfavored subjects of race, color, creed, religion or
gender, while at the same time permitting equally abusive messages which
did not address those topics. R.A. V.,
112 S. Ct. at 2547. In addition, the
Court reasoned that because there were
content-neutral alternatives available,
such as prosecuting the conduct under
an arson statute, the city's compelling
interest in protecting minority groups
from victimization did not justify the
law's discrimination. Id at 2550.
The Court next outlined the two
exceptions to content-based discrimination. The flI'st exception occurs when
the purpose of the distinction is content-neutral. Id. at 2545. A$ an illustration, the Court noted that a state
could prohibit obscenity generally, but
it could not prohibit obscenity that
only included offensive political messages.ld at2546. Similarly, the Court
noted that burning a flag in violation of
an arson statute was punishable, but it
had been held content-discriminatory
to punish flag burning in violation ofa
law against dishonoring the flag. Id. at
2544 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989». "Fighting
words," according to the Court, were
unprotected because ''their content
embodie[d] an intolerable mode of
expression." R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at
2549. Justice Scalia's analysis suggested that cross burning was not "especially offensive" as it did not communicate ideas in a ''threatening (as
opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner." Id.
The Court then addressed the second exception which would permit
content-based discrimination: where
the regulation was aimed at the secondary effects of the speech without
reference to the content of the speech.
Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters
Inc.,475U.S.41,48 (1986». TheCity
ofSt. Paul cited this second exception
as the basis forthe discrimination in its
ordinance, arguing that the St. Paul
ordinance was not intended to stifle
freedom of expression, but rather was
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to protect against the victimization of
people who were particularly wlnerable to discrimination. R.A. v., 112S.
Ct. at 2549. The Court, reasoning that
the "emotive impact of speech on its
audience is not a secondary effect,
found that the St. Paul ordinance was
not directed to secondary effects because it handicapped "specific categories" of speech. [d. (quotiug Boos \I.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988».
In a concurring opinion, Justice
White argued that the case should have
been decided by finding the ordinance
fatally overbroad. [d. at 2550. As
written, the ordinance could prevent
modes ofexpression that had offensive
content but were not themselves threatening or harmful. For this reason,
Justice White charged the majority with
renouncing the traditional use of strict
scrutiny review as atool ofFirstAmendment analysis. Under a strict scrutiny
analysis, restrictions on speech are justified where the statute is narrowly
tailored and necessary for the achievement of a compelling interest. The St.
Paul ordinance, according to Justice
White, could have survived a strict
scrutiny review if it was more narrowly drafted. He faulted the majority
for effecting an underinclusive standard which suggested that the statute
should have banned a wider category
ofspeech than was necessary to achieve
the city's interest. This perceived departure from strict scrutiny analysis
was criticized in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision Burson \I.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), in
which the participating members of
the present Court agreed that a strict
scrutiny standard is applicable to a
case involving a First Amendmentchallenge to acontent-based statute. R.A. V. ,
112 S. Ct. at 2551.
The concurrence also argued that
the majority violated Court precedent
by not categorically including fighting
words among constitutionally prohibited speech. [d. at 2552-53. Justice
White recognized that fighting words
made up no "essential part ofany exposition of ideas" and were wholly un-

protected by the FirSt Amendment because they were "directed at individuals to provoke violence or to inflict
injury." [d. at 2553 (quoting
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
In a separate concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens noted his frustration
with the majority's attitude towards
the dangers of hate speech. R.A. V., 112
S. Ct. at 2570. In a footnote referring
to the Los Angeles riots, he wrote,
"one need look no further than the
recent social unrest in the nation's cities to see that race-based threats may
cause more harm to society ... than
other threats." [d. at 2570 n.9.
The Supreme Court's ruling that
banning cross burnings and swastika
displays on the basis of content violates the First Amendment is significant because most states have enacted
some form of hate speech legislation
that will be invalidated by this decision. R.A. V. \I. St. Paul will probably
stand as one of the most far-reaching
interpretations of the First Amendment. Although the bottom line was
balanced, the analysis was insensitive.
The majority's seeming perception of
hate speech as no more than a societal
nuisance is offensive to the many
Americans whose lives were threatened by the very actions which the
majority characterizes as merely "obnoxious." To many, the sight of a
burning cross on the front lawn or a
swastika display on the temple wall
exceeds mere speech and proposes a
direct threat of physical violence.
Moreover, the Court's fractured consensus on First Amendment analysis,
as applied to hate speech, will likely
leave many lawyers bewildered over
how to litigate hate crimes, and will
leave many legislators perplexed about
how to formulate a hate crime statute.

Lucas\l. South Carolina Coastal Council: LANDOWNER COMPENSATIONREQUIRED WIIEREPROPERTY REGULATIONS DEPRIVE
ALLECONONUCALLYBENEnCIAL USE OF LAND UNLESS
REGULATIONS ARE INHERENT
IN TITLE.
The United States Supreme Court's
most recent inverse condemnation de-

cision,Lucas \I. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), intro-

duced a new approach to determine
whether a property owner has suffered
a regulatory taking requiring the payment ofjust compensation. The Court
developed a test which inquires into
the underlying principles ofthe state's
property and nuisance law. The new
test considers whether the challenged
regulations merely make explicit restrictions on the property's use that
were inherent in the title to the property
itself. If so, then no compensation is
required under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, even if the regulation
deprives the owner ofall economically
beneficial use of the land.
In 1986, David Lucas purchased
two residential lots on the Isle ofpalms,
a barrier island located east of Charleston, South Carolina. Just as neighboring landowners had done on their land,
Lucas intended to build single-family
homes on his $975,000 parcels. His
plans, however, were thwarted by the
South Carolina Legislature in 1988
with the passage of the Beachfront
Management Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§
48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1991) (''the Act"). The Act established
a baseline connecting the furthest-inland points of erosion during the last
forty years and prohibited the construction of "occupiable improvements" seaward of the baseline. Be- Kim Germaine Judd cause the baseline fell inland ofLucas' s
lots and his proposed homes constituted "occupiable improvements."
Lucas was prohibited from building on
his land.
Lucas challenged the Act in the
South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas, arguing that the law's effect on
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